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Abstract
Textbooks on statistics emphasize care and precision, via concepts such as reliability and
validity in measurement, random sampling and treatment assignment in data collection, and
causal identification and bias in estimation. But how do researchers decide what to believe and
what to trust when choosing which statistical methods to use? How do they decide the credibility
of methods? Statisticians and statistical practitioners seem to rely on a sense of anecdotal
evidence based on personal experience and on the attitudes of trusted colleagues. Authorship,
reputation, and past experience are thus central to decisions about statistical procedures.
The rules of evidence as presented in statistics textbooks are not the same as the informal
criteria that statisticians and practitioners use in deciding what methods to use.
According to the official rules, statistical decisions should be based on careful design of data
collection, reliable and valid measurement, and something approximating unbiased or calibrated
estimation. The first allows both some choice of the assumptions and an opportunity to increase
their credibility, the second tries to avoid avoidable noise and error and third tries to restrict to
methods that are seemingly fair. This may be fine for evaluating psychological experiments, or
medical treatments, or economic policies, but we as statisticians do not generally follow these rules
when considering improvements in our teaching (Gelman and Loken, 2012) nor when deciding what
statistical methods to use.
Did Fisher decide to use maximum likelihood because he evaluated its performance and the
method had a high likelihood? Did Neyman decide to accept a hypothesis testing framework for
statistics because it was not rejected at a 5% level? Did Jeffreys use probability calculations to
determine there were high posterior odds of Bayesian inference being correct? Did Tukey perform a
multiple comparisons analysis to evaluate the effectiveness of his multiple comparisons procedure?
Did Rubin use matching and regression to analyze the efficacy of the potential-outcome framework
for causal inference? Did Efron perform a bootstrap of existing statistical analyses to demonstrate
the empirical effectiveness of resampling? Do the authors of textbooks on experimental design use
their principles to decide what to put in their books? No, no, no, no, no, no, and no. We do know
some psychometricians who fit item response models to evaluate their exam questions, and this
is one of the very few examples we can think of where statistics researchers are using statistical
principles to make professional decisions. Gigerenzer and colleagues have done some for deciding to
use percentages versus natural frequencies for better understanding of analysis when those doing
the analysis are medical students or faculty.
How, then, do we gain our knowledge about how to analyze data? This is a question that arises
over and over as we encounter new sources of data that are larger and more structured than ever
before. How we decide to believe in the effectiveness of a statistical method? Following Gelman
(2013), here are a few potential sources of evidence:
1. Mathematical theory (for example, coherence of inference or asymptotic convergence);
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2. Computer simulations (for example, demonstrating approximate coverage of interval estimates
under some range of deviations from an assumed model);
3. Solutions to toy problems (for example, the comparison of Rubin (1981) of a partial pooling
estimate for a test-preparation program in eight schools to the no pooling or complete pooling
estimates);
4. Improved performance on benchmark problems (for example, getting better predictions for the
Boston Housing Data (Harrison and Rubinfeld, 1978), an example much beloved of textbook
writers in statistics and computer science);
5. Cross-validation and external validation of predictions (see Vehtari and Ojanen, 2012), as can
be done in various examples ranging from education to business to election forecasting;
6. Success as recognized in a field of application (for example, a statistical method that is used
and respected by biologists, or economists, or political scientists);
7. Success in the marketplace of software or textbooks (under the theory that if people are
willing to pay for something, it is likely to have something to offer);
8. Face validity: whether the method seems reasonable. This can be a minimum requirement
for considering a new method.
As noted by Gelman (2013), “None of these is enough on its own. Theory and simulations are
only as good as their assumptions; results from toy problems and benchmarks don’t necessarily
generalize to applications of interest; cross-validation and external validation can work for some
sorts of predictions but not others; and subject-matter experts and paying customers can be fooled.
The very imperfections of each of these sorts of evidence and how they apply to different user
populations and settings gives a clue as to why it makes sense to care about all of them. We can’t
know for sure so it makes sense to have many ways of knowing.” Informal heuristic reasoning is
important even in pure mathematics (Polya, 1941).
There is also the concern that a statistical method will be used differently in the field than
in the lab, so to speak—or, to give this problem a pharmaceutical spin, that a new method,
approved for some particular class of problems, will be used “off-label” in some other setting. Rubin
(1984) discusses concerns of recommending methods of analysis for repeated use by those (and
often ourselves) with limited statistical expertise, limited resources, and limited time. To further
complicate this, there has long been experimental evidence that optimal methods of information
processing do not always not lead to optimal human performance, and this varies by level of skill,
incentives and time pressure (Driver and Streufert, 1967).
We may also wish to consider how we should choose between methods in given applications
for ourselves, to recommend to colleagues of similar or different levels of technical skill, and to
communities of users who are not full-time statisticians or quantitative analysts. That is, how
should we go about approving statistical methods for use in various applications by various users,
making reasoned, critical choices. To do this we lean on background material, again following the
model of the choice of medical treatments for use by various professionals or end users. Our primary
objective is to maximize the rate of learning about the empirical application while minimizing the
rate and magnitude of mistakes. These goals require a sort of meta-evidence that is not captured
by any single sort of inquiry. More generally, we have argued that stories, to the extent that they
are anomalous and immutable, are central to building understanding in social science (Gelman and
Basbøll, 2013).
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How do we build trust in statistical methods and statistical results? There are lots of examples
but out of familiarity we will start with my (Gelman’s) own career. My most cited publications
are my books and my methods papers, but I think that much of my credibility as a statistical
researcher comes from my applied work. It somehow matters, I think, when judging my statistical
work, that I’ve done (and continue to do) real research in social and environmental science.
Why is this? It’s not just that my applied work gives me good examples for my textbooks.
It’s also that the applied work motivated the new methods. Most of the successful theory and
methods that my collaborators and I have developed, we developed in the context of trying to solve
active applied problems. The methods have faced real challenges and likely have been appropri-
ately tempered in some generally relevant ways. At the very least, any of our new methods are
computationally feasible, have face validity, and solve at least one applied problem. In developing
and applying these methods, we weren’t trying to shave a half a point off the predictive error in
the Boston housing data; rather, we were attacking new problems that we couldn’t solve in any
reasonable way using existing approaches.
That’s fine, but in that case who cares if the applied work is any good? To put it another way,
suppose my new and useful methods had been developed in the context of crappy research projects
where nobody gave a damn about the results? The methods wouldn’t be any worse, right? The
mathematics does not care whether the numbers are real or fake. I have an answer to this one: If
nobody cared about our results we would have little motivation to improve. Here’s an example.
A few years ago I posted some maps based on multilevel regression and post stratification of pre-
election polls to show how different groups of white people voted in 2008. The blogger and political
activist Kos noticed that some of the numbers in my maps didn’t make sense. Kos wasn’t very
polite in pointing out my mistakes, but he was right. So I want back and improved the model
(with the collaboration of my student Yair Ghitza). It took a few months, but at the end we had
better maps—and also a better method (which was later published in the American Journal of
Political Science). This all only happened because I and others cared about the results. Kos and
other outsiders performed severe testing of our conclusions, which ruined the face validity of our
claims, and then we went through a process of trying getting the representation (model) less wrong
for this particular empirical problem. If all we were doing was trying to minimize mean squared
predictive error, I doubt the improvements would’ve done anything at all. Indeed, it turns out
that it is difficult to identify improvements in hierarchical models via cross-validated mean squared
error, even with large sample sizes (see Wang and Gelman, 2013, a paper that was developed as our
attempt to understand our challenges in comparing different models for this and similar small-area
estimation problems).
This is not to say that excellent and innovative statistical theory can’t be developed in the
absence of applications or, for that matter, in the context of shallow applications. For example,
my popular paper on prior distributions for group-level variance parameters (Gelman, 2006) came
through my repeated study of the 8-schools problem of Rubin (1981), a dead horse if there ever
was one. Hierarchical modeling is still unsettled, and it was possible to make a contribution in this
field using an example without any current applied interest. In many cases, though, seriousness of
the application, the focus required to get details right (the representation less wrong), was what
made it all work.
As suggested earlier, one possible way to better cover all the issues and challenges of deciding
on which statistical method is most credible is to borrow from the regulatory review and approval
perspective that is brought to bear on deciding which medical treatments should be approved, for
what purpose, by whom, in which circumscribed situations. The actual reasons for statisticians
and non-statisticians choosing statistical methods in practice may be less interesting, likely being
largely more to do with perceived authority, sociology (peer group), psychology, and economics (skill
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level, access to software, budget limitations of client) than any putative evidence. A regulatory
perspective would attempt to set this aside, at least until the benefits and harms of methods have
been assessed along with their relative value/importance and the real uncertainties about these are
clarified. We are not literally suggesting that statistical methods be subject to regulatory approval
but rather that this perspective can help us make sense of the mix of information available about
the effectiveness of different research methods.
More recently, it has been argued that truth comes form “big data” (see Hardy, 2013, for a
contrary view). We agree with the saying “data trumps analysis” but in practice it can be easier to
work with small datasets we understand than with large datasets with unknown selection biases.
For example, in our analysis of home radon levels (Lin et al., 1999), we used national and state-
level random sample surveys of about 80,000 homes (which sounds like a lot but is not that much
when you consider that radon concentrations vary spatially, and there are over 3000 counties in the
United States), ignoring millions of measurements that were collected by individual homeowners,
buyers, and sellers, outside of any survey context. We suspect that were we to have ready access
to the large set of self-selected data, it would be possible to perform some analysis to calibrate
with respect to the more carefully gathered measurements and get the best of both worlds. In that
particular example, however, we doubt this will ever happen because there is not such a sense of
urgency about the problem; our impression is that just about everyone who is worried about radon
has already had their house measured. For other problems such as medical treatments (or, in the
business world, social advertising), we suspect that much can be learned (indeed, is already being
learned) by combining experimental measurements with larger available observational data (see,
for example, Kaizar, 2011, and Chen, Owen, and Shi, 2013).
This article is appearing in a volume whose goal is to consider “a future agenda for theoretical
or methodological research on authorship, functional roles, reputation, and credibility on social
media.” We do not have a clear sense of what this agenda should be, but we think it important
to recognize the disconnect between our official and unofficial modes of reasoning in statistics, and
the many different sources of practical evidence we use to make professional decisions. A fruitful
direction of future research could be the formalization of some of our informal rules, much in
the way that Rosenbaum (2010) formalized and critiqued the well-known rules of Hill (1965) in
epidemiology.
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